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A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (cre-
dences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance
through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al.
(2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to un-
dergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the in-
dividual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians
should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public or even private
information (learnt by not all or just one individual), or to non-representable infor-
mation (not corresponding to an event in the algebra on which credences are held).
I propose a taxonomy of six kinds of ‘group Bayesianism’, which differ in the type of
information for which Bayesian revision of group credences is required: public rep-
resentable information, private representable information, public non-representable
information, and so on. Six corresponding theorems establish exactly how individual
credences must (not) be aggregated such that the resulting group credences obey
group Bayesianism of any given type, respectively. Aggregating individual credences
through averaging is never permitted. One of the theorems – the one concerned with
public representable information – is essentially Russell et al.’s central result (with
minor corrections).
1 Three challenges for Bayesian groups
Bayesianism requires an agent’s beliefs to take the form of coherent probability as-
signments (probabilism) and to be revised via Bayes’ rule given new information
(conditionalization). Let us apply these requirements to a group agent: let a group
itself hold probabilistic beliefs and revise them via Bayes’ rule. Such Bayesianism
for groups – or group Bayesianism – faces three challenges which distinguish it from
ordinary Bayesianism for individuals.
1Paris School of Economics & CNRS, www.franzdietrich.net, fd@franzdietrich.net. I am very
grateful to Marcus Pivato. Important parts of the technical results were developed jointly with him
in February 2015.
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The first challenge comes from the fact that group beliefs are not free-floating,
but determined at any point of time by the current beliefs of the group members,
as is usually assumed. Formally, there exists a function, the pooling rule, which
transforms any possible combination of individual credences into group credences.
For instance the averaging rule defines the group credence in an event as the average
individual credence in it. The question is: which pooling rules guarantee group
Bayesianism? To see the problem, imagine new information comes in. According to
the pooling rule, the new group beliefs are obtained by pooling the new individual
beliefs. Meanwhile by group Bayesianism the new group beliefs are obtained by
revising the old group beliefs via Bayes’ rule. So pooling the revised individual
beliefs should yield the same as revising the old group beliefs. This places a severe
mathematical constraint on the choice of pooling rule. The mentioned averaging
rule violates this constraint; so it generates non-Bayesian group beliefs. One might
try to defend averaging by arguing that Bayesian conditionalization is not always
the right revision policy (Joyce 1999, Ha´jek 2003) and that averaging may suit the
different revision policy of ‘imaging’ (Leitgeb forth.), and besides that averaging is
the basis of Lehrer and Wagner’s (1981) consensus formation theory. But if we accept
the Bayesian paradigm, as in this paper, then the failure of group beliefs to obey
conditionalization is a death penalty for the averaging rule, so that we must search
for other pooling rules, as done by Russell et al. (2015) and the present paper.
The second challenge pertains to the question of what information learning ac-
tually means for a group. Who learns? I propose to distinguish between public
information (learnt by all members), private information (learnt by only one mem-
ber), and partially spread information (learnt by some but not all members). The
question is for which type(s) of information to require Bayesian revision of group
beliefs.
The third challenge pertains to the fact that some information might not be
representable by any event in the domain (algebra) on which credences are defined.
The group might learn that the radio forecasts rainy weather, but it might hold
credences only relative to ‘weather events’, not ‘weather-forecast events’. In such
a case ordinary Bayesian revision is not even defined. Yet a generalized form of
Bayesian revision can still be applied, as explained later. The question is whether
to require Bayesian revision of group beliefs even for non-representable information.
This question is of course not strictly limited to group agents; it could be raised for
individual agents too. But the question is far more pressing for group agents, because
the domain of group beliefs (the algebra of events to which the group assigns proba-
bilities) tends to be much smaller than the domain of an individual’s beliefs, so that
information tends to be far less often representable for groups than for individuals.
This is true for practical and theoretical reasons.2 It is thus urgent to account for
2In practice, it is hard or impossible to form group beliefs on more than a few events via explicit
aggregation or voting. So the domain of real-life group beliefs formed via voting is a fortiori small.
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non-representable information when properly studying the revision of group beliefs.
The second and third challenges pertain to the notion of information relevant to
groups. Instead of definitely opting for some notion of information, I will consider
different notions: public representable information, private representable informa-
tion, public non-representable information, and so on. Each type of information
considered will give rise to a specific form of group Bayesianism, requiring Bayesian
conditionalization on information of this type.
The paper makes a conceptual and a mathematical contribution. The conceptual
contribution is to lay out a taxonomy of six kinds of group Bayesianism, as just
indicated. The mathematical contribution is to determine those credence pooling
rules which guarantee group Bayesianism of each given sort. This is done in six
theorems, one for each kind of group Bayesianism. These theorems respond to the
first challenge, and do so for different types of group Bayesianism, i.e., different
positions one might take relative to the second and third challenges.
Although the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to groups in the literature
on probabilistic opinion pooling (e.g., Madansky 1964, Morris 1974, Dietrich 2010),
Russell et al.’s (2015) prize-winning contribution3 seems to be the first to put on the
agenda the most basic Bayesian principle, i.e., standard conditionalization, open-
ing up a new research programme. They however take for granted that informa-
tion is public and representable, thereby restricting attention to one type of group
Bayesianism. The present theorem for this type of group Bayesianism is essentially
their central result, except from minor variations and corrections. Another type
of group Bayesianism – that for public non-representable information – already ap-
peared much earlier in the statistics literature under the label “external Bayesianity”
(Madansky 1964). The theorem for this type of group Bayesianism seems to be new.
All this calls for an explicit theory of group Bayesianism(s), which this paper hopes
to deliver. A very different, so-called ‘supra-Bayesian’ approach to group beliefs
goes back to Morris (1974).4 Probabilistic opinion pooling is reviewed in Genest and
Zidek (1986) and Dietrich and List (2016).
Also in theory group beliefs are defined for fewer events than individual beliefs. Indeed, since group
credences are obtained by aggregating individual credences, group credences can only exist where
individual credences exist, so that the domain of group beliefs must be at most as large as the
intersection of the (often different) individual domains of beliefs. That intersection might be very
small.
3It was selected by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best philosophy papers in 2015.
4Supra-Bayesianism reduces group beliefs to the posterior beliefs of an external social planner
who treats the group members’ credences as evidence on which he conditionalizes his own beliefs.
I would argue that this reduction violates the very notion of group beliefs, which is not supposed
to depend on any external observer. Supra-Bayesianism is not a theory of Bayesian groups.
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2 The formal machinery of credence pooling
Consider a group of n individuals. We label them i = 1, 2, ..., n. The group size
n is any finite number greater than one. The individuals hold probabilistic beliefs
(credences) relative to certain events. As usual, the set of these events forms an
algebra, so that we can negate and conjoin events. To model this, I introduce a set
W of worlds, and define events as arbitrary sets of worlds A ⊆ W . The number of
worlds in W is finite and exceeds two; the infinite case is addressed in Appendix A.5
A credence function is a probability function C on the set of events.6 The proba-
bility C(A) of an event A is called the credence in A. The credence in a world a ∈ W
is of course defined as the credence in the corresponding event: C(a) := C({a}). Note
that
∑
a∈W C(a) = 1 and that the probabilities of worlds fully determine those of all
events.
The beliefs of the various group members are summarized in the ‘credence profile’.
Formally, a (credence) profile is a list C = (C1, ..., Cn) of credence functions, where Ci
represents the credences of member i. I use bold-face symbols (C, C′, ...) to denote
credence profiles as opposed to single credence functions. For any so-denoted profile
I denote its members by ‘un-bolding’ the symbol and adding individual indices. So
the profile C is made up of C1, ..., Cn, the profile C
′ of C ′1, ...., C
′
n, and so on. A
credence profile C is coherent if at least one world has non-zero probability under
each individual credence function in C; otherwise the profile is incoherent. Coherence
is a plausible feature. For one would expect that at least the true world – whichever
world it is – receives non-zero probability by everyone. After all no-one should have
any (evidential or theoretical) grounds for totally excluding the true world.
Given a credence profile, what should the group as a whole believe? An answer
to this question can be formally captured by a a pooling rule, i.e., a function which
aggregates the credence profile into group credences. Formally, a pooling rule is a
function ag mapping any credence profile C (from the rule’s domain of applicability)
to a ‘group’ credence function ag(C), denoted agC for short. I now give four exam-
ples, representing different approaches or theories of how group credences depend on
individual credences:
• The averaging rule defines the group credence in an event A as the average of
individual credences: agC(A) = 1
n
C1(A) + · · ·+ 1nCn(A). The rule’s domain of
applicability is universal, i.e., consists of all credence profiles, since averages of
probability functions are always well-defined probability functions.
• More generally, the weighted averaging rule with weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 of sum
5Some readers might prefer the objects of beliefs to be propositions; they should simply rein-
terpret events as propositions. Others might not like modelling events (or propositions) as sets of
worlds; I work with sets of worlds following common practice, but nothing hinges on this.
6Technically, it is a function C mapping events to numbers in [0, 1] such that C is additive (i.e.
C(A ∪B) = C(A) + C(B) whenever A ∩B = ∅) and C(W ) = 1.
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one is the rule which defines the group credence in an event A as the weighted
average of individual credences: agC(A) = w1C1(A) + · · · + wnCn(A). The




• The geometric rule defines the group credence in a world a as the (re-scaled)
geometric average of individual credences: agC(a) = k[C1(a)]
1/n · · · [Cn(a)]1/n,
where k is a profile-dependent scaling factor determined such that the total
probability of worlds is one (so k = 1/{∑b∈W [C1(b)]1/n···[Cn(b)]1/n}). The rule’s do-
main of applicability is not universal. It includes only the coherent credence
profiles, because for incoherent profiles C the geometric average [C1(a)]
1/n · · · [Cn(a)]1/n
is zero at all worlds a and so cannot be re-scaled to a probability function. The
definition focuses on group credences in worlds, but group credences in events
follow automatically by summing across corresponding worlds.
• More generally, the weighted geometric rule with weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 defines
the group credence in a world a by a (re-scaled) weighted geometric expression:
agC(a) = k[C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn , where k is again a scaling factor ensuring a
total probability of one (so k = 1/{∑b∈W [C1(b)]w1 ···[C(b)]wn}). The rule applies only
to coherent credence profiles to ensure well-definedness. The weights w1, ..., wn




3 Bayesian conditionalization for groups
Bayesianism requires that an agent who learns an event E revises his credence func-
tion C by adopting the (conditional) credence function C ′ = C(·|E) which to any
event A assigns the conditional probability C(A|E) = C(A∩E)
C(E)
. This assumes that
C(E) 6= 0 to ensure that conditionalization is defined. Henceforth, expressions like
‘conditionalizing the credence function C on E’ and ‘conditionalization of C on E’
will denote that the conditional credence function C(·|E) is being formed, and a
fortiori that C(E) 6= 0.
Like Russell et al. (2015), I apply the requirement of Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion to groups: group credences should change by conditionalization whenever a new
event E is learnt. So the group’s new credences which aggregate the post-information
profile C′ must be obtainable by conditionalizing the group’s old credences which ag-
gregate the pre-information profile C. Formally: agC′ = agC(·|E). In other words,
Bayesian revision and aggregation commute, as illustrated in Figure 1. However,
what does it mean that E is learnt? Russell et al. take it for granted that infor-
mation is public: all group members learn E, so that the new credence profile is
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Figure 1: Revising aggregate credences versus aggregating revised credences
so that the new credence profile is C′ = (C1(·|E), C2, ..., Cn) in which individuals
2, ..., n have kept their old credences. In full generality, E might be learnt by some
arbitrary subgroup of one or more individuals, so that only the credences of these
individuals change.
These considerations suggest the following group Bayesianism axiom:
Conditionalization on information (Bay): If a credence profile C changes to
another one C′ by conditionalization of one or more individual credence functions
on an event E (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the new group credence
function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on E.
This axiom strengthens a group Bayesianism axiom restricted to public informa-
tion and introduced by Russell et al.:
Conditionalization on public information (BayPub): If a credence profile C
changes to another one C′ by conditionalization of all individual credence functions
on an event E (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the new group credence
function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on E.
A third group Bayesianism axiom focuses on private information:
Conditionalization on private information (BayPri): If a credence profile C
changes to another one C′ by conditionalization of exactly one individual credence
function on an event E (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the new group
credence function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on E.
All three incarnations of group Bayesianism are prima facie of interest and have
their privileged contexts of application, as argued in Section 8. Before exploring each
axiom formally, let me give five arguments for why non-public information matters.
First, the Bayesian paradigm requires conditionalization as the universal belief
revision policy. There is no principled Bayesian reason for suddenly lifting the re-
quirement if information is not public. Any failure to conditionalize on information
is un-Bayesian, regardless of how many or few people have access to the information.
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The question of how widely information spreads is epistemically irrelevant, at least
to Bayesians. Information matters not in virtue of being widely accessible, but in
virtue of being true, where truth is ascertained as soon as one individual fully ac-
quires the information. Repeated observation of the exactly same information (by
different people) is no better than one-time observation, in vague analogy to the old
evidence problem (e.g., Glymour l980, Hartmann and Fitelson forth.)
Second, let us see where radical Bayesianism takes us (without necessarily com-
mitting to it). A full-fledged Bayesian has a highly subjective notion of information.
He will submit that information is almost never public and hence that the axiom
BayPub neglects most instances of information learning in groups. This is because
two individuals almost never learn precisely the same event: even when Anne and
Peter both see the car arriving, they will have seen the car from slightly different
angles and will thus have observed (and conditionalized on) slightly different events.
This of course assumes that information is described in full detail, which renders the
algebra of events and thus the set of possible worlds W very rich and complex – an
unrealistic but standard Bayesian assumption.
Third, groups which fail to conditionalize on information are Dutch-bookable
regardless of whether the information is public. Russell et al. put forward the Dutch
book argument to defend conditionalization on public information. The argument is
easily adapted to non-public information: it suffices to choose the bookie as someone
who learns the (non-public) information, possibly even a group member.
Fourth, differences in information across a group constitute a salient real-life phe-
nomenon which is at the heart of theories of group agency, multi-agent systems and
distributive cognition. Groups are often said to know more than each of their mem-
bers. In our framework, this means that group credences incorporate all information
held by at least one member, which immediately suggests the axiom Bay. By con-
trast, the weaker axiom BayPub reflects the different idea that a group knows only
what all (not some) members know, so that the group typically knows much less
than each of its members.
Fifth, it seems ad hoc to exclude learning of non-public information, i.e., asym-
metries in learning across individuals, because on the other hand we do allow asym-
metries in status-quo knowledge. Status-quo knowledge can differ across individu-
als since in a credence profile C different individuals can be certain of (i.e., assign
probability one to) different events. So the framework is geared towards knowledge
asymmetries at any given point of time, i.e., within any given profile. If individu-
als always learned the same things, one wonders how they could end up knowing
different things.
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4 The implication of Bayesian conditionalization
for groups
What does group Bayesianism in each of the above versions Bay, BayPub or BayPri
imply for how group beliefs must be formed, i.e., how the pooling rule must look like?
To see how severely group Bayesianism constrains the pooling rule, note that once
we have fixed how a given profile C is aggregated, we are no longer free in how to
aggregate any other profile C′ which can arise from C through information learning:
agC′ must notoriously be given by conditionalization of agC on the information.
Before establishing the precise implication of each axiom, I clarify the logical
relation between the three axioms. Surprisingly, BayPri is only apparently weaker
than Bay: groups which conditionalize on private information must also condition-
alize on non-private information (this will no longer be true for non-representable
information, as seen later). By contrast, BayPub is a genuinely weaker axiom. The
logical gap between BayPub and Bay is filled by a crisp axiom:
Certainty adoption (Cert): Events which are certain to some group member are
certain to the group, i.e., for all credence profiles profiles C (in the rule’s domain)
and events E, if Ci(E) = 1 for some individuals i, then agC(E) = 1.
Cert is a plausible axiom in groups of rational agents, because if some group
member is fully certain of E, then he presumably has definitive evidence or arguments
for E, so that the group has reason to adopt that certainty. The following result
summarizes the mentioned logical relationships:
Proposition 1. A rule for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfies Bay if and
only if it satisfies BayPri, and if and only if it satisfies both BayPub and Cert.
I now consider each of the three Bayesian axioms in turn and study its implication.
I shall use two auxiliary axioms which, broadly speaking, force the pooling rule to
be non-degenerate or well-behaved. The first auxiliary axiom requires that if every
group member is utterly ignorant, i.e., holds the uniform credence function (which
deems each world equally likely), then also the group as a whole is utterly ignorant:
Indifference preservation (Indiff): If C is the credence profile in which the
individuals unanimously hold the uniform credence function (and if the rule applies
to C), then the group credence function agC is also uniform.
The second well-behavedness axiom requires group credences to depend contin-
uously on individual credences: small changes in individual credences should never
lead to jumps in group credences. Formally, an infinite sequence of credence func-
tions C1, C2, ... converges to a credence function C if for every event A the sequence
of probabilities C1(A), C2(A), ... converges to C(A).
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Continuity (Contin): If a sequence of credence profiles C1,C2, ... converges in each
individual component to a credence profile C (and if the rule applies to all these
profiles), then the sequence of group credence functions agC1, agC2, ... converges to
agC.
By the first theorem, the full-blown Bayesian axiom Bay (along with the two
well-behavedness axioms) forces the pooling rule to be a weighted geometric rule in
which every individual has non-zero weight, i.e., ‘has a say’:
Theorem 1. The only rules for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfying Bay,
Indiff and Contin are the weighted geometric rules giving non-zero weight to each
individual.
So all pooling rules except weighted geometric rules with non-zero weights are
un-Bayesian (by violating Bay) or degenerate (by violating Indiff or Contin). For
instance, all weighted or unweighted averaging rules and all weighted geometric rules
giving zero weight to someone violate Bay; but they satisfy Indiff and Contin. What
is the intuition behind the fact that the three axioms are jointly necessary and
sufficient for the rule to be of this special geometric sort? Sufficiency is hard to prove.
As for necessity, one easily checks that a weighted geometric rule is continuous and
preserves indifference. Why does it also satisfy Bay, assuming no individual has zero
weight? Suppose certain individuals learn an event E, so that the profile changes.
For every individual i who has learnt E, his credences in worlds change to zero
for worlds outside E and change proportionally for worlds inside E – this is how
conditionalization works. As a result, the expression [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn changes
to zero for worlds a outside E and changes proportionally for worlds a inside E.
This implies that group credences change via conditionalization on E, as required by
Bay. It is crucial in this argument that every weight wi is non-zero: otherwise it can
happen that everyone i who learns E has weight wi = 0, so that his belief revision
leaves the wi-th power of his credences in worlds unchanged. For p
0 is always defined
as 1, even for p = 0.
Next we turn to the weaker group Bayesianism axiom BayPub which allows non-
Bayesian revision in the face of non-public information. Being weaker, this require-
ment opens the door to a larger class of pooling rules, namely by allowing geometric
rules with some zero weighs:
Theorem 2. The only rules for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfying BayPub,
Indiff and Contin are the weighted geometric rules giving non-zero weight to at least
one individual.
Why does a weighted geometric rule meet BayPub as soon as one individual i gets
non-zero weight? In short, public information E is then guaranteed to be observed
by someone with non-zero weight, which suffices to push the group’s credence in
worlds outside E to zero.
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Theorem 2 is essentially Russell et al.’s central theorem (their ‘Fact 4’), to which
it however adds three necessary qualifications and one optional amendment. The
optional amendment is that I impose indifference preservation instead of Russell et
al.’s neutrality axiom, since indifference preservation is less demanding and achieves
the same.7 As for the three qualifications, firstly I assume the number of worlds to
be finite rather than possibly countably infinite, to ensure that weighted geometric
rules are well-defined for any non-negative weights; in Appendix A I show how the
countably infinite case can be handled.8 Secondly, I do not permit all weighted ge-
ometric rules, but only those with at least one non-zero weight.9 Thirdly, I allow
only coherent credence profiles. The third qualification is already introduced retro-
spectively by Russell et al. in their proof appendix where they restate their result
differently. Some of their readers might come to think that the result is essentially
true even without excluding incoherent profiles, i.e., that the result is true without
domain restriction provided one suitably extends weighted geometric rules to inco-
herent profiles. This is not the case. Without domain restriction the axioms are
inconsistent with all weighted geometric rules (however extended) except from the
dictatorship-like rules assigning zero weight to all but one individual. I return to the
aggregation of possibly incoherent credence profiles in Section 7, where I show that
group Bayesianism is essentially impossible in ‘incoherent groups’.
Finally, what is the implication of requiring group Bayesianism relative to private
information? Since BayPri is equivalent to Bay (by Proposition 1), the implication
of BayPri is precisely that of Bay. So we can restate Theorem 1 using BayPri instead
of Bay:
7Indifference preservation is a particularly weak sort of unanimity axiom, since it requires pre-
serving not all unanimously held credence functions, but only the uniform one. The neutrality ax-
iom requires treating all worlds equally. Formally, whenever pi is a permutation of the set of worlds
(which allows us to transform any credence function C into a new one Cpi given by Cpi(a) = C(pi(a))
for all worlds a), then transforming the aggregate credence function agC is equivalent to aggregating
the profile Cpi of transformed credence functions: (agC)pi = agCpi. Neutrality implies indifference
preservation because transforming the uniform credence function under a permutation yields the
same uniform credence function.
8The problem with applying the notion of geometric rules naively to a countably infinite set of
worlds is that if the weights w1, ..., wn sum to a value below one, then for certain coherent credence
profiles C the geometric average [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn has an infinite sum across worlds a and
thus fails to be rescalable such that the sum across worlds is one (defining the scaling factor as
k = 1∞ = 0 does not do). See Appendix A for details.
9The statement of Russell et al.’s Fact 4 (“The only rules which obey [the axioms] are Weighted
Geometric Rules”) allows for two readings: either the rules obeying the axioms are claimed to be
all the Weighted Geometric Rules (as suggested by the authors’ claim to characterize weighted geo-
metric pooling), or the rules obeying the axioms are claimed to be among the Weighted Geometric
Rules (as suggested by the authors’ restatement of their Fact 4 in their appendix). Under the first
reading Theorem 2 corrects their Fact 4. Under the second reading Theorem 2 strengthens their
Fact 4 by turning an implication into an equivalence, i.e., into a characterization result.
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Theorem 3. The only rules for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfying BayPri,
Indiff and Contin are the weighted geometric rules giving non-zero weight to each
individual.
5 Bayesian conditionalization for groups facing non-
representable information
A key idealization often made by Bayesians is that any information an agent might
ever learn is representable as an event within the domain (algebra) where the agent
assigns probabilities. This ensures that Bayes’ rule in its ordinary form applies. Real-
life information need not be representable in this way, in particular in the context of
group agents which tend to hold beliefs relative to a small event algebra that excludes
much of what can be learnt. Taking up an introductory example, the group might
hold credences only relative to weather events; so worlds in W describe the weather,
nothing else. The information that the radio forecasts rain is not representable as
an event E ⊆ W since worlds in W do not describe weather forecasts. Yet credences
should clearly be revised, presumably by raising the probability of the (representable)
event of rain.
How should credences be revised based on non-representable information? There
is a well-known Bayesian answer: model such information as a likelihood function
rather than an event and apply Bayes’ rule in its generalized form. Although all this
is known to Bayesian statisticians, a short introduction is due. A likelihood function
is an arbitrary function L from worlds to numbers in [0, 1]. One interprets L as
modelling some information and L(a) as being the probability of that information
given that the world is a. In the weather example, L(a) is the probability that
the radio forecasts rain (the information) given that the world is a. Since weather
forecasts are usually right, L(a) is near 1 for rainy worlds a and near 0 for non-rainy
worlds a.
Given how likelihood functions are interpreted, it is clear how one should condi-
tionalize on them, i.e., how Bayes’ rule in its generalized version works. An agent
who learns a likelihood function L should revise his credence function C by adopt-
ing the (conditional) credence function C(·|L) which to every world a assigns the
probability C(a|L) = C(a)L(a)∑
b∈W C(b)L(b)
. One immediately recognizes Bayes’ rule, given
that L(a) stands for the probability of information conditional on a. The conditional
credence function C(·|L) is only defined if the likelihood function L is coherent with
C, i.e., if there is at least one world where both L and C are non-zero, ensuring that∑
b∈W C(b)L(b) 6= 0. Intuitively, coherence of L with C means that the information
is not ruled out by the initial credences. Hereafter, expressions like ‘conditionalizing
C on L’ and ‘conditionalization of C on L’ will denote that the conditional credence
function C(·|L) is being formed, and a fortiori that L is coherent with C.
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Likelihood functions generalize events as a model of information, and Bayes’
rule for likelihood functions generalizes Bayes’ rule for events. Indeed, to any event
E corresponds a simple likelihood function L for which L(a) can only be 1 or 0,
depending on whether a is in E or outside E; and conditionalizing on E is equivalent
to conditionalizing on the corresponding likelihood function L, as one easily checks.
It is natural to require groups to follow Bayes’ rule not just if an event is learnt,
but more generally if a likelihood function is learnt. This requirement can once again
be fleshed out in three different ways, depending on whether the likelihood function
is learnt by any subgroup of individuals, or by all individuals (public information),
or by just one individual (private information). The three resulting axioms are
counterparts of the earlier axioms Bay, BayPub and BayPri. They differ from their
counterparts only in that the learnt information is given by a likelihood function L
rather than an event E. Being based on a more general notion of information to
be called L-information, each new axiom is strictly stronger than its counterpart, as
indicated by the ‘+’ in the label of each new axiom.
Conditionalization on L-information (Bay+): If a credence profile C changes
to another one C′ by conditionalization of one or more individual credence functions
on a likelihood function L (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the new group
credence function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on L.
Conditionalization on public L-information (BayPub+): If a credence profile
C changes to another one C′ by conditionalization of all individual credence functions
on a likelihood function L (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the new group
credence function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on L.
Conditionalization on private L-information (BayPri+): If a credence profile
C changes to another one C′ by conditionalization of exactly one individual credence
function on a likelihood function L (and if the rule applies to C and C′), then the
new group credence function agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on L.
6 The implication of Bayesian conditionalization
for groups facing non-representable information
We have seen in Section 5 that a group which obeys ordinary Bayesian condition-
alization – Bayesian conditionalization on events – must form its credences in a
particular way that depends on the chosen group Bayesian axiom (Bay, BayPub or
BayPri). What happens to the pooling rule if we impose Bayesian revision even for
non-representable information, i.e., if we require Bay+, BayPub+ or BayPri+?
As in Section 5, I start the analysis by clarifying the logical relationship between
the three axioms at stake. The situation changes dramatically compared to the earlier
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axioms Bay, BayPub and BayPri. While the earlier axioms are highly compatible
with each other (by Proposition 1), the new axioms are mutually incompatible:
Proposition 2. No rule for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfies both BayPub+
and BayPri+.
So, in short, group credences cannot incorporate both public and private L-
information in a proper Bayesian way. As an immediate consequence, the full-blown
axiom Bay+, which simultaneously strengthens BayPub+ and BayPri+, is internally
inconsistent:
Theorem 4. No rule for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfies Bay+.
This striking impossibility does not require imposing any of the well-behavedness
axioms Indiff and Contin: Bay+ is by itself inconsistent, hence untenable as a norma-
tive principle for group beliefs. How should we interpret this? On one interpretation,
groups simply cannot be ‘fully Bayesian’: their belief revision policy cannot be as ide-
ally rational as that of single individuals. But there is a more nuanced interpretation.
Recall that the need to conditionalize on non-representable information came from
a lack of Bayesian rationality in the first place: an inability to assign probabilities
to ‘everything’, so that the set of events under consideration – the credence domain
– fails to encompass all relevant information. I gave an example where the credence
domain fails to contain an event representing the information of a rainy weather fore-
cast. If by contrast the credence domain is universal, as many Bayesians routinely
assume, then all relevant information is by definition representable by an event in
the credence domain, and we lose the justification for introducing L-information and
imposing Bay+ because the initial axiom Bay already covers all relevant informa-
tion. In sum, Bay+ becomes normatively mandatory only when and because another
Bayesian requirement – that of a universal credence domain – is violated. Accord-
ingly, Theorem 4 does not tell us that groups cannot be fully Bayesian, but that they
cannot be ‘semi-Bayesian’ by failing to entertain a universal credence domain while
properly conditionalizing on information outside the credence domain.
The impossibility disappears once we restrict attention to public or to private
L-information. Indeed groups can follow Bayesian conditionalization on such in-
formation, by using a pooling rule of a quite particular kind. I begin with public
L-information:
Theorem 5. The only rules for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfying Bay-
Pub+, Indiff and Contin are the geometric rules whose individual weights sum to
one.
The comparison to Theorem 2 shows that BayPub+ constrains the pooling rule
much more than BayPub does: the individual weights must now sum to one. Surpris-
ingly, this result seems to be new, although its central axiom BayPub+ has already
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been studied under the label “external Bayesianity”, though in a different framework
(Madansky 1964).10
Finally, how can groups follow Bayesian conditionalization on private generalized
information? They can do so in precisely one way, namely by using the multiplicative
pooling rule (Dietrich 2010, Dietrich and List 2016). It determines the group credence
in each world as the (re-scaled) product of the members’ credences in that world. This
is a special case of weighted geometric pooling in which each individual gets weight
one.
Theorem 6. The only rule for pooling coherent credence profiles satisfying BayPri+
and Indiff is the multiplicative rule, i.e., the geometric rule giving weight one to each
individual.
The comparison of Theorems 5 and 6 shows that it makes a considerable difference
whether the group wishes to properly incorporate public or private L-information.
In the former case the weights must sum to one, in the latter they must all equal one.
This gives an idea of why the two axioms are mutually inconsistent (see Proposition
2). Theorem 6 does not involve the axiom Contin. It is a version of a result by
Dietrich and List (2016) in a different framework.11
7 The impossibility of group Bayesianism for in-
coherent groups
Our analysis has so far been limited to rules that pool coherent credence profiles,
in which at least one world is assigned non-zero probability by everyone. In short,
we have excluded radical disagreement. Incoherent profiles are peculiar in that they
violate the idea that some world is ‘true’ and receives non-zero subjective probability
from everyone. Can one design pooling rules that are Bayesian and apply also to
incoherent credence profiles? The answer is negative: if we permit incoherent profiles,
there do no longer exist any non-degenerate Bayesian rules – regardless of which of
our six Bayesian axioms is taken to define group Bayesianism.
10How could it have escaped the statistics literature that this axiom (jointly with well-behavedness
axioms) forces to certain geometric pooling rules? Presumably the reason is that the axiom is usually
stated and analysed in a different framework in which credence functions and likelihood functions
must take non-zero values at all worlds. This excludes representable information, since a likelihood
function corresponding to representable information, i.e., to an event E, takes the value 0 outside
E and is thus excluded (unless E = W ). So the classic axiom of external Bayesianity actually
differs from BayPub+ in that it covers only non-representable rather than also non-representable
information. The analogue of Theorem 5 in that classic framework is false, because the (restated)
axioms can be met by generalized versions of weighted geometric rules whose weights can depend
on the profile in certain systematic ways.
11Their framework takes all credence functions and likelihood functions to have non-zero values
at all worlds. This difference in framework has no consequence for the result.
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To state the result formally, I first define two kinds of degenerate rules for pooling
arbitrary credence profiles. A dictatorship is a rule such that the group always
adopts the credences of a fixed group member. Formally, there is an individual i
(the dictator) such that agC = Ci for all credence profiles C. A power dictatorship
is a rule which, like an ordinary dictatorship, makes group credences depend solely
on a fixed individual. But the group might not adopt that individual’s credences as
such: it might adopt a transformed version of his credences, obtained by raising the
probabilities of worlds to some power. Formally, a power dictatorship is a rule for
which there exists an individual i (the power dictator) and a number w > 0 such
that for any credence profile C the group credences in worlds a ∈ W are given by
agC(a) = k[Ci(a)]
w, where k > 0 is a scaling factor ensuring that probabilities of
worlds sum to one (i.e., k =
∑
b∈W [Ci(b)]
w). In case w = 1 we obtain a regular
dictatorship.
Theorem 7. Among all rules for pooling arbitrary (possibly incoherent) credence
profiles,
(a) no rules satisfy the axioms stated in Theorem 1, 3, 4, or 6, respectively,
(b) only the power dictatorships satisfy the axioms stated in Theorem 2,
(c) only the dictatorships satisfy the axioms stated in Theorem 5.
Let me paraphrase this result. If we seek to aggregate arbitrary credence pro-
files, then only power dictatorships can properly handle public information, only
dictatorships can properly handle public L-information, and no rules whatsoever can
properly handle the other four types of information.
8 Conclusion: each group Bayesianism matters
I have argued that there are different types of group Bayesianism, depending on the
kind of information on which one requires groups to conditionalize. Each form of
group Bayesianism is compatible with certain credence pooling rules, determined in
Theorems 1–6. Specifically, group beliefs must be formed via a weighted geomet-
ric rule, where the weights must obey certain conditions depending on the type of
group Bayesianism in question. Group Bayesianism however becomes impossible if
the members can disagree radically, i.e., if the credence profile can be incoherent
(Theorem 7).
Which of the six group Bayesian axioms is the right rendition of group Bayesian-
ism? The answer depends on the group or application in question. I propose the
following stylized classification. The first dimension of classification concerns how
widely information can spread in the group in question:
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• Fully symmetrically informed groups are idealized groups whose members have
exactly the same access to new information (perhaps due to perfect deliberation
and information sharing). New information is then by definition public, and
the Bayesian axiom need only quantify over public information. This leads to
BayPub or BayPub+.
• Fully asymmetrically informed groups are idealized groups whose members
never learn the same information. New information is then by definition pri-
vate, and the Bayesian axiom need only quantify over private information. This
leads to BayPri or BayPri+.
• Groups with arbitrary information spread are groups without any restriction
on how widely new information is accessible. New information may thus be
acquired by any subgroup, and the Bayesian axiom should quantify over infor-
mation acquired by any subgroup. This leads to Bay or Bay+.
The second dimension of classification concerns the size of the domain (algebra) of
events on which the group in question holds credences:
• Groups with universal credence domain are idealized groups in which the do-
main of credences comprises everything relevant to the group in question, in-
cluding any information that can be acquired. New information is thus always
representable, and the Bayesian axiom need only quantify over representable
information. This leads to Bay, BayPub or BayPri.
• Groups with limited credence domain are groups in which the credence domain
fails to encompass certain information that can be acquired in the group in
question. New information can thus be non-representable, and the Bayesian
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Figure 2: Contexts of application and their corresponding group Bayesianism axioms
and pooling rules
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Figure 2 summarizes the stylized classification of groups or applications, in each
case displaying the relevant group Bayesianism axiom and the corresponding pooling
rule(s) according to Theorems 1–6. This shows how strongly the axiomatic rendition
of group Bayesianism and the pooling rule should depend on the application.
A Generalization to infinitely many worlds
The main text took the number of worlds (hence, of events) to be finite. This calls
for a generalization. In both appendices let the set of worlds be countable, i.e., finite
or countably infinite. To extend our formal results to that case, we must do two
things: generalize the notion of weighted geometric pooling, and adapt the axiom of
Indifference Preservation. I shall do both things in turn. But first let me anticipate
what is thereby achieved:
Remark 1. All formal results of the main text (the ‘theorems’ and ‘propositions’) hold
more generally for countably many worlds if weighted geometric rules are generalized
as below and Indifference Preservation is replaced by Weak Indifference Preservation
defined below.
Generalizing geometric rules: What can happens if we naively apply our
earlier definition of the weighted geometric rule to infinitely many worlds? Given
weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 and a (coherent) credence profile C = (C1, ..., Cn), we first
form for each world a the weighted geometric average [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn . The
trouble arises as we attempt to normalize this expression to a probability mass func-
tion: normalization fails when the sum
∑
a∈W [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [C(a)]wn is infinite. To see
that the sum can be infinite, let the set of worlds be W = {1, 2, 3, ...}, let the sum
of weights be w1 + · · · + wn = 12 , and let each individual i have the same credence
function assigning probability ca−2 to each world a, where c is a positive constant
which ensures that the probabilities of worlds sum to one. The weighted geometric
average then takes the form [C1(a)]













c∞ = ∞. Normalization is
thus impossible here. However normalization is guaranteed to be possible for certain
choices of the weights:
Proposition 3. If the number of worlds is (countably) infinite, the following two
conditions on weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 are equivalent:
• The weighted geometric average [C1(a)]w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn is normalizable (i.e., has
finite sum over worlds a) for each coherent credence profiles (C1, ..., Cn).
• The sum of weights satisfies w1 + · · ·+ wn ≥ 1.
This tells us that for infinitely many worlds weighted geometric pooling is mean-
ingful if and only if the sum of weights is at least one. I therefore generalize the
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notion of geometric rules as follows to the countable case: a weighted geometric rule
is defined
• for arbitrary weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 if the number of worlds is finite,
• for weights w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 of sum at least one if the number of worlds is count-
ably infinite,
where for each coherent credence profile the group credence in a world a is determined
in the usual way, i.e., as the normalized weighted geometric average credence in a.
We can now talk meaningfully about weighted geometric rules for countable W ,
bearing in mind that the weights by definition have sum at least one if W is infinite.
Note that if we were to require (rather than permit) W to be countably infinite,
then we could simplify Theorem 2: we would no longer need to require that at least
one individual gets non-zero weight, as this already follows from the sum of weights
being at least one.
Adapting Indifference Preservation: The axiom of Indifference Preservation
(Indiff) is meaningless for infinitely many worlds, because the uniform distribution
does then not exist. Indeed, one cannot assign the same probability x to infinitely
many worlds, as the sum of probabilities would not be one, but infinite (if x > 0) or
zero (if x = 0). We can instead use this axiom:
Weak indifference preservation (Indiff*): For all worlds a and b, unanimous
indifference between a and b is at least sometimes preserved, i.e., there is at least
one credence profile C (in the rule’s domain) such that every individual i satisfies
Ci(a) = Ci(b) 6= 0 and the group satisfies agC(a) = agC(b).
This axiom has a double advantage over ordinary Indifference Preservation: (i) it
stays meaningful for infinitely many worlds, and (ii) it is weaker for finitely many
worlds since the credence profile where everyone holds uniform beliefs automatically
has the property required in Indiff*.12 Our results could use Russell et al.’s ‘neutral-
ity’ axiom instead of Indiff*; that axiom is however much stronger.
B Proofs
I now prove all results from the main text and Appendix A. The results from the
main text will be proved in their generalized version defined in Appendix A. So
throughout the set of worlds W is countable (finite or countably infinite), Indiff* is
used instead of Indiff, and the notion of weighted geometric rules is extended to the
12Strictly speaking, Indiff* is weaker under the minimal assumption that the profile of uniform
credence functions belongs to the rule’s domain.
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infinite case in the above-defined way (so that weights must sum to at least one in
the infinite case).
Conventions: The conditionalization of a credence function C on an event E or a
likelihood function L will (when existent) be denoted by C|E and C|L, respectively.
As usual, the support of a credence function C is supp(C) := {a ∈ W : C(a) 6= 0}.
B.1 The propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a rule ag for pooling coherent profiles. Axiom
Bay obviously implies BayPub and BayPri. The proof is completed by showing three
claims.
Claim 1: BayPri implies Bay.
Assume BayPri and consider coherent profiles C and C′ such that C′ arises
from C by conditionalization of the credence functions of m individuals on an event
E, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Without loss of generality, suppose these m individuals
are the individuals 1, ...,m. Note that for all j ∈ {0, 1, ...,m} the credence profile
Cj := (C1|E, ..., Cj|E,Cj+1, ..., Cn) is coherent. Moreover, each profile Cj with j 6= 0
arises from Cj−1 by conditionalization of exactly one individual credence function
on E. So we can apply BayPri repeatedly:
agCm = (agCm−1)|E
= ((agCm−2)|E)|E = (agCm−2)|E
= ...
= ((agC0)|E)|E = (agC0)|E.
Since C0 = C and Cm = C′, we have shown that agC′ = (agC)|E. This proves Bay.
Claim 2: BayPri implies Cert.
Assume BayPri. Let C be a coherent profile, E an event and i an individual such
that Ci(E) = 1. So the profile arising from C by conditionalization of i’s credence
function on E is C itself. Hence by BayPri agC = (agC)|E. So agC(E) = 1, proving
Cert.
Claim 3: BayPub and Cert together imply BayPri.
Assume BayPub and Cert. Let a coherent profile C′ arise from another one C
by conditionalization of an individual i’s credence function an event E. Let C′′ be
the profile obtained from C or equivalently from C′ by conditionalization of every
credence function on E. Note that C′′ is coherent given the way it is obtained from
the coherent profile C′ in which an individual assigns probability one to E. Since in
C′ individual i assigns probability one to E, by Cert agC′(E) = 1. Now
agC′ = (agC′)|E = agC′′ = (agC)|E,
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where the first equation holds as agC′(E) = 1, and the second and third because of
BayPub. We have shown that agC′ = (agC)|E, proving BayPri. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For a contradiction, let some rule ag for pooling co-
herent profiles satisfy BayPub+ and BayPri+. Consider a coherent profile C in
which every credence function has full support, and let L be a non-constant like-
lihood function with full support. For all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} define the credence pro-
files Cj := (C1|L, ..., Cj|L,Cj+1, ..., Cn). Note that all Cj are coherent. By Bay-
Pub+, agCn = (agC)|L. On the other hand, repeated application of BayPri+ yields
agCn = (agC)|Ln, because
agCn = (agCn−1)|L
= ((agCn−2)|L)|L = (agCn−2)|L2
= ...
= ((agC0)|Ln−1)|L = (agC0)|Ln = (agC)|Ln.
As agCn = (agC)|L and agCn = (agC)|Ln, we have (agC)|L = (agC)|Ln. It
follows that L is proportional to Ln, by definition of conditionalization on a likelihood
function (and by the fact that agC has full support, which holds via Lemma 3 below
as all Ci have full support). So L must be a constant function, in contradiction to
our assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let W be countably infinite, and consider weights
w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 whose sum is denoted w.
1. First assume w < 1. If w = 0, so that w1 = · · · = wn = 0, then normalization
fails for all profiles C since
∑
a∈W [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn =
∑
a∈W 1 = ∞. Now let
w > 0. To show that normalizability can fail, I give a counterexample generalizing
that stated in Appendix A. Without loss of generality let worlds be natural num-
bers: W = {1, 2, 3, ...}. Consider the credence profile C in which each Ci assigns
probability ca−1/w to world a, where c is a normalization constant ensuring that





















−1 is the so-called harmonic series, which is well-known to have infinite
limit.
2. Now assume w ≥ 1, and consider any coherent profile C. I show normalisability
by distinguishing between two cases.
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Case 1 : w = 1. For any world a, we have [C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn ≤ w1C1(a) +
· · ·+ wnCn(a) by the inequality between (weighted) geometric and arithmetic means
(e.g., Steele 2004). So∑
a∈W
[C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn ≤
∑
a∈W








= w1 + · · ·+ wn = w = 1 <∞.




w (as Ci(a) ≤ 1 and wi > wiw ). So∑
a∈W
[C1(a)]





w · · · [Cn(a)]wnw <∞,






B.2 Preparing the theorems’ necessity proofs
The following two lemmas will later allow us to prove that the axioms in our theorems
are necessary : each axiom in a theorem is satisfied by each particular (weighted
geometric) rule specified in that theorem.
Lemma 1. A weighted geometric rule satisfies
(a) Bay (or equivalently BayPri) if and only if all weights are non-zero,
(b) BayPub if and only if at least one weight is non-zero,
(c) BayPub+ if and only if the weights sum to one,
(d) BayPri+ if and only if all weights are one, i.e., the rule is multiplicative.
Proof. Consider a weighted geometric rule with weights w1, ..., wn. The proof
will be sketched informally.
(a) The proof that Bay holds if all wi are non-zero was already given (informally)
after Theorem 1. Conversely, if some individual’s weight is zero, then conditionalizing
his credence function on an event E never affects group credences, so that Bay is
violated.
(b) The proof that BayPub holds if some wi is non-zero was again given informally
after Theorem 2. Conversely, if all wi are zero, which by the way implies that W is
finite, then group credences are uniform regardless of the profile, violating BayPub.
(c) Whenever one coherent credence profile C′ arises from another C by condi-
tionalization of all credence functions on a given likelihood function L, we have (*)
21
agC′ = (agC)|Lw1+···+wn , i.e., agC′ is the conditionalization of agC on the likeli-
hood function Lw1+···+wn . This is because, for appropriate normalization constants
k, k′, k′′ > 0, we have at all worlds a
agC′(a) = k[(C1|L)(a)]w1 · · · [(Cn|L)(a)]w1
= k′[C1(a)L(a)]w1 · · · [Cn(a)L(a)]wn
= k′[C1(a)]w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn [L(a)]w1+···+wn
= k′′[(agC)|Lw1+···+wn ](a).
Clearly, if w1 + · · ·wn = 1, then BayPub+ holds, as (*) reduces to agC′ = (agC)|L.
Conversely, assume BayPub+. Then, with C,C′, L as before, we have agC′ =
(agC)|L, and hence by (*) (agC)|L = (agC)|Lw1+···+wn . So L must be propor-
tional to Lw1+···+wn (assuming agC has full support, which we can ensure by letting
all credence functions in C have full support and applying Lemma 3 below). It fol-
lows that w1 + · · ·+ wn = 1 (assuming without loss of generality that L was chosen
to be non-constant).
(d) For any given individual i, whenever one coherent credence profile C′ arises
from another C by conditionalization of i’s credence function on a likelihood function
L, we have (**) agC′ = (agC)|Lwi . The reason is analogous to that for (*) in the
proof of (c).
Now, if w1 = · · · = wn = 1, then BayPri+ holds, as (**) reduces to agC′ =
(agC)|L. Conversely, suppose BayPri+. With C,C′, L as before, agC′ = (agC)|L
by BayPri+. So, for all individuals i, we have (agC)|L = (agC)|Lwi by (**), implying
that wi = 1 by an argument parallel to that in the proof of (c).
Lemma 2. Every weighted geometric rule satisfies Contin, Indiff (ifW is finite),
and Indiff*.
Proof. The elementary argument is left to the reader. 
B.3 Preparing the theorems’ sufficiency proofs
The next lemmas will help us show that the axioms in any of our theorems are suf-
ficient : they require the particular type of pooling rule claimed in each theorem,
respectively. Central steps of the argument, including the use of Cauchy’s func-
tional equation, correspond directly to steps in Russell et al.’s proof of their “Claim
4”. Each lemma of this subsection assumes a rule ag for pooling coherent credence
profiles.
Lemma 3. For all coherent credence profiles C,
(a) under Bay, supp(agC) = ∩isupp(Ci),
(b) under any of the six Bayesian axioms, ∩isupp(Ci) ⊆ supp(agC) ⊆ ∪isupp(Ci).
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Proof. Let C be a coherent credence profile. It suffices to prove three claims.
Claim 1: Under Bay, supp(agC) ⊆ ∩isupp(Ci).
Suppose Bay. Let a be a world not in ∩isupp(Ci). Pick an individual i such
that a 6∈ supp(Ci). Since Ci(W\{a}) = 1 and since pooling is certainty adopting by
Proposition 1, we have agC(W\{a}) = 1. So a 6∈ supp(agC).
Claim 2: Under BayPub (the weakest Bayesian axiom), ∩isupp(Ci) ⊆ supp(agC).
Assume BayPub and let a ∈ ∩isupp(Ci). Since the profile C′ in which every
individual assigns probability one to a is coherent and arises from C by conditional-
ization of everyone’s credence function on the singleton event {a}, BayPub tells us
that agC′ arises by conditionalization of agC on {a}. In particular, a ∈ supp(agC).
Claim 3: Under BayPub, supp(agC) ⊆ ∪isupp(Ci).
Under BayPub, since C is unchanged if all credence functions are conditionalized
on E = ∪isupp(Ci), we have agC = (agC)|E, and thus agC ⊆ E.
Lemma 4. Under any of the six Bayesian axioms and Indiff*, for all coherent cre-
dence profiles C and worlds a, b ∈ W , if Ci(a) = Ci(b) 6= 0 for each individual i,
then agC(a) = agC(b) 6= 0.
Proof. Assume Indiff* and BayPub, the weakest Bayesian axiom by Proposition
1. Consider a coherent profile C and a, b ∈ W such that Ci(a) = Ci(b) 6= 0 for all indi-
viduals i. By Indiff* there is another coherent profile C′ such that C ′i(a) = C
′
i(b) 6= 0
for all individuals i and agC′(a) = agC′(b). Conditionalizing all members of C on
E = {a, b} yields the same (coherent) profile, denoted C′′, as conditionalizing all
members of C′ on E. So, applying BayPub twice, (agC)|E = agC′′ = (agC′)|E.
Hence, as ((agC′)|E)(a) = ((agC′)|E)(b), we have ((agC)|E)(a) = ((agC)|E)(b),
and thus agC(a) = agC(b). Finally, this value is non-zero, since otherwise agC would assign zero probability to E
and could thus not be conditionalized on E. 
Lemma 5. Under any of the six Bayesian axioms and Indiff*,
(a) group probability ratios are a function of individual probability ratios, i.e.,










for all worlds a, b ∈ W and all coherent credence profiles C
in which everyone gives non-zero probability to a and to b,
(b) this function satisfies f(1) = 1 and f(xy) = f(x)f(y) for all x,y ∈ (0,∞)n
(where ‘1′ stands for ‘(1, ..., 1)’ and ‘xy’ stands for ‘(x1y1, ..., xnyn)’).
Proof. Assume Indiff* and the by Proposition 1 weakest Bayesian axiom, Bay-
Pub. I proceed in several claims (the first two of which do not require Indiff*).










for all coherent profiles C in which every
individual assigns non-zero probability to a and to b.
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Consider a 6= b in W . Uniqueness of such a function fa,b follows from the fact that







for some coherent profile C.
As for existence of the function, consider coherent profiles C and C′ in which a and





for all i. We have




agC′(b) . Conditionalizing everyone’s credence function on E =
{a, b} transforms C and C′ into the same (coherent) profile C′′, which by BayPub




agC′(b) , where these
two ratios are well-defined and non-zero because agC(a), agC(b), agC′(a), agC′(b) 6=
0 by Lemma 3.
Claim 2: fa,c(xy) = fa,b(x)fb,c(y) for all x,y ∈ (0,∞)n and all pairwise distinct
a, b, c ∈ W .
Consider x,y ∈ (0,∞)n and pairwise distinct a, b, c ∈ W . The claimed relation
follows from the definition of the functions fa,b, fb,c, fa,c, because one can construct a























Claim 3: All fa,b for a 6= b are the same function, to be denoted f . (This shows
part (a) restricted to the case a 6= b).
Consider worlds a, a′, b, b′ with a 6= b and a′ 6= b′, and let x ∈ (0,∞)n. I need to
show that fa,b(x) = fa′,b′(x). I distinguish between three cases.
Case 1 : a = a′. Here I need to show that fa,b(x) = fa,b′(x). We may pick a
coherent profile C such that Ci(b) = Ci(b


















Case 2: b = b′. By an argument analogous to that in Case 1, fa,b(x) = fa′,b(x).
Case 3 : a 6= a′ and b 6= b′. I show that fa,b(x) = fa′,b′(x) by distinguishing
between three subcases and drawing on Cases 1 and 2:
• If a 6= b′, then fa,b(x) = fa,b′(x) = fa′,b′(x).
• If a′ 6= b, then fa,b(x) = fa′,b(x) = fa′,b′(x).
• If a = b′ and a′ = b, then, choosing any c ∈ W\{a, b} (by using that |W | ≥ 3),
fa,b(x) = fa,c(x) = fb,c(x) = fb,a(x).
Claim 4: f(1) = 1.
By applying Claims 2–3 with x = y = 1, one obtains that f(11) = f(1)f(1).
Since 11 = 1 it follows that f(1) = 1.














for all coherent credence profiles C in which all Ci assign non-zero probabilities to a
and b. (This essentially extends Claim 3 to the case that a = b.)
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. In case a 6= b this holds already by Claim 3. In case a = b it










Lemma 6. Given the assumptions and notation of Lemma 5,
(a) under BayPri+, f(x1, ..., xn) = x1 · · · xn for all (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (0,∞)n and the
pooling rule is multiplicative pooling,
(b) under Contin, there are w1, ..., wn ≥ 0 such that f(x1, ..., xn) = xw11 · · ·xwnn for
all (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (0,∞)n and the pooling rule is the weighted geometric rule
with weights w1, ..., wn (in particular, w1 + · · ·+ wn ≥ 1 if W is infinite).
Proof. We use the assumptions and notation of Lemma 5.
Claim 1: Under BayPri+, f(x1, ..., xn) = x1 · · ·xn for all (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (0,∞)n.
Assume BayPri+ and let (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (0,∞)n. I prove by induction that
f(x1, ..., xi, 1, ..., 1) = x1 · · ·xi for all i = 0, 1, ..., n. The initial step where i =
0 is obvious: f(1, ..., 1) = 1 by Lemma 5. Now assume the claim holds for a
given i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, i.e., f(x1, ..., xi, 1, ..., 1) = x1 · · ·xi. I have to show that
f(x1, ..., xi+1, 1, ..., 1) = x1 · · ·xi+1.. Pick worlds a 6= b and a coherent credence pro-






= (x1, ...xi, 1..., 1). Let C
′ be the coherent profile arising from C by
conditionalizing the credence function of individual i+1 on a likelihood function L for
which L(a), L(b) 6= 0 and L(a)
L(b)















= (x1, ...xi+1, 1..., 1). Now


























= f(x1, ...xi, 1..., 1)xi+1
= (x1 · · ·xi)xi+1 = x1 · · ·xi+1,
where the first equation on the second line applies BayPri+.
Claim 2: Under BayPri+, the pooling rule is the multiplicative rule.
Assume BayPri+. Let ag∗ be the multiplicative rule. I show that ag = ag∗.
Consider a coherent profile C. Since BayPri+ implies BayPri and thus Bay (see
Proposition 1), the group credence function agC assigns zero probability to worlds
outside ∩isupp(Ci) by Lemma 3(a). So does clearly the multiplicative group credence
function ag∗C. It thus remains to show that agC and ag∗C coincide on words in
∩isupp(Ci), i.e., worlds to which everyone assigns non-zero probability. It suffices
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ag∗C(b) . This equation holds because each side equals
C1(a)
C1(b)







· · · Cn(a)
Cn(b)





· · · Cn(a)
Cn(b)
by definition
of the multiplicative rule.
Claim 3: Under Contin, there are n numbers, henceforth denoted w1, ..., wn ∈ R,
such that f(x1, ..., xn) = x
w1
1 · · ·xwnn for all (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (0,∞)n.
Assume Contin. Define the function g : Rn → R by g(x) = log(f(ex1 , ..., exn)) for
all x ∈ Rn. By Lemma 5(b) and the properties of the logarithm and the exponential
function, it follows that g(x + y) = g(x)+g(y) for all x,y ∈ Rn. So g obeys Cauchy’s
functional equation. Further, g is continuous, since f is continuous by Contin. So g
is linear, i.e., there are weights w1, ..., wn ∈ R such that
g(x) = w1x1 + · · ·+ wnxn for all x ∈ Rn
by a fundamental theorem on functional equations (see Acze´l 1966). It follows that
f(x) = eg(logx1,...,logxn) = elog(x
w1
1 ···xwnn ) = xw11 · · ·xwnn for all x ∈ (0,∞)n.
Claim 4: Under Contin, for each full-support profile C (i.e., each profile in which
everyone assigns non-zero probability to all worlds) there is a constant k > 0 such
that agC(a) = k[C1(a)]
w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn for all worlds a. (This ‘almost’ shows that ag
is a weighted geometric rule, except that we only quantify over full-support profiles
and have not proved that w1, ..., wn are non-negative.)
Assume Contin. Consider a full-support profile C. Fix a world b ∈ W . Define
the constants k′ = agC(b) and k′′ = [C1(b)]w1 · · · [Cn(b)]wn . Note that k′, k′′ > 0


























w1 · · · [Cn(a)]wn ,
where the first equation on the second line holds by Claim 3. This show Claim 4
with k = k
′
k′′ .
Claim 5: Under Contin, w1, ..., wn ≥ 0.
Assume Contin. Suppose for a contradiction that i is an individual such that
wi < 0. Consider a world a ∈ W , and a sequence of full-support profiles Ck (k =
1, 2, ...) converging to a credence profile C in which Ci has support W\{a} and each
Cj with j 6= i has full support W . By the fact that wi < 0 and Claim 4, agCk
converges to the probability measure assigning probability one to a. This is because
[Ck1 (a)]
w1 · · · [Ckn(a)]wn tends to infinity (the term [Ci(a)]wi tends to infinity) while
for all other worlds b 6= a [Ck1 (b)]w1 · · · [Ckn(b)]wn tends to a finite value. Meanwhile
by Contin agCk also converges to agC. It follows that agC(a) = 1. So the support
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of agC is {a}. This contradicts the fact that the support of agC must include the
intersection of supports ∩msupp(Cm) = W\{a} by Lemma 3.
Claim 6: Under Contin, ag is the weighted geometric rule with weights w1, ..., wn.
Assume Contin. By Claim 4, ag coincides with this weighted geometric rule on
the subdomain of full-support profiles. This subdomain is dense in the full domain of
coherent profiles: every coherent profile is the limit of some sequence of full-support
profiles, as readers can easily check. Since ag and the weighted geometric rule with
weights w1, ..., wn are two continuous rules on the domain of coherent profiles which
coincide on a dense subdomain, the two rules coincide globally. 
B.4 Completing the theorems’ proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First, any weighted geometric rule whose weights are all
positive satisfies Bay by Lemma 1(a) and satisfies Contin and Indiff* (and under
finite W Indiff) by Lemma 2. Conversely, if a rule for aggregating coherent profiles
satisfies Bay, Contin and Indiff*, then by Lemma 6(b) it is a weighted geometric
rule, where by Lemma 1(a) the weights are all positive. 
Proof of Theorem 2. First, any weighted geometric rule with at least one positive
weight satisfies BayPub by Lemma 1(b), as well as Contin and Indiff* (and under
finite W Indiff) by Lemma 2. Conversely, if a rule for aggregating coherent profiles
satisfies BayPub, Contin and Indiff*, then by Lemma 6(b) it is a weighted geometric
rule, where by Lemma 1(b) some weight is positive. 
Proof of Theorem 3. This result follows from Theorem 1 via Proposition 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4. This result follows from Proposition 2, as Bay+ implies
BayPub+ and BayPri+. 
Proof of Theorem 5. First, each weighted geometric rule whose weights sum to
one satisfies BayPub+ by Lemma 1(c), and also Contin and Indiff* (and under finite
W Indiff) by Lemma 2. Conversely, if a rule for aggregating coherent profiles satisfies
BayPub+, Contin and Indiff*, then by Lemma 6(b) it is a weighted geometric rule,
where by Lemma 1(c) the weights sum to one. 
Proof of Theorem 6. First, the multiplicative rule satisfies BayPri+ by Lemma
1(d), and satisfies Indiff* (and under finite W Indiff) by Lemma 2. Conversely, if a
rule for pooling coherent profiles satisfies BayPri+ and Indiff*, then by Lemma 6(a)
it is the multiplicative rule. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Let D be the domain of all coherence profiles, and D′ the
subdomain of all coherent credence profiles. I prove the three claims in a different
order.
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(b) First, any power dictatorship satisfies BayPub, Contin and Indiff* (and Indiff
if W is finite). The argument is similar to that given for weighted geometric rules; it
suffices to adapt Lemmas 1 and 2. Conversely, consider a rule ag defined on D and
satisfying BayPub, Contin and Indiff*. Let ag′ be its restriction to D′. Check that
ag′ still satisfies the three axioms. So it must by Theorem 2 be a weighted geometric
rule whose weights w1, ..., wn are not all zero. I consider two cases.
Case 1: only one individual, say individuals i, has non-zero weight wi. Then ag is
the power dictatorship with power dictator i and power wi, because (i) ag coincides
with this power dictatorship on the subdomain D′ which (as one may check) is dense
in D, and (ii) ag and the power dictatorship are continuous rules.
Case 2: at least two individuals, say individuals i and j, have non-zero weights. I
derive a contradiction. Fix two worlds a 6= b, and consider profiles Ck (k = 1, 2, ...) in
which i’s credences are given by Cki (a) = 2
−k and Cki (b) = 1− 2−k, j’s credences are
given by Ckj (a) = 1− 2−k2 and Ckj (b) = 2−k2 , and any other member m’s credences





. As Ck is coherent, agCk is given by weighted

















which converges to ∞. So agCk converges to the credence function assigning prob-
ability one to a.
Now construct another sequence of profiles Dk (k = 1, 2, ...), in which Dk is
defined like Ck except that the roles of k and k2 are interchanged: so Dki (a) = 2
−k2 ,
Dki (b) = 1 − 2−k2 , Dkj (a) = 1 − 2−k, Dkj (b) = 2−k, and Dkm(a) = Dkm(b) = 12 for all
members m 6= i, j. Applying the weighted geometric formula again, we find that
agDk(c) = 0 for worlds c 6= a, b and that agDk(a)
agDk(b)
converges to 0 rather than ∞. So
agDk converges to the credence function assigning probability one to b rather than
a.
Meanwhile, as one easily checks, the profiles Ck and Dk both converge to a same




members m 6= i, j). So agCk and agDk both converge to agC by Contin. This
contradicts the fact that agCk and agDk converge to different credence functions.
(c) First, any dictatorship satisfies BayPub+, Contin and Indiff* (and Indiff if
W is finite). The argument is again similar to that for weighted geometric rules.
Conversely, consider a rule ag on D satisfying BayPub+, Contin and Indiff*. Its
restriction to D′, denoted ag′, still satisfies these axioms. So it must by Theorem 5
be a weighted geometric rule whose weights w1, ..., wn sum to one. There are two
cases.
Case 1: only one individual i has non-zero weight, hence weight one. Then ag is
the dictatorship by individual i, by the same continuity argument as under Case 1
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above.
Case 2: more than one individual has non-zero weight. Then a contradiction can
be derived by an argument parallel to that under Case 2 above.
(a) Consider a rule ag on D satisfying the axioms in Theorem 1, 3, 4 or 6. Its
restriction to D′, denoted ag′, still satisfies these axioms. In the case of the axioms
of Theorem 4 this already is a contradiction. In the case of the axioms of Theorem 1,
3 or 6, it follows by the theorem that ag′ is a weighted geometric rule whose weights
w1, ..., wn are all non-zero. This implies a contradiction, just as under Case 2 in the
proofs of (b) and (c). 
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